Skip to the technical version
The simple version
When you press send, the app locks the message on your device. The server only carries the locked package to the recipient's device, which is the only one holding the key to open it. We do not have that key, so we cannot read it, even if someone asks us to.
What the server cannot see
- Text, photos, video, audio, stickers and files in conversations
- The location and contact you send
- Which message was deleted for everyone
- Your password and your private keys
- The names in your address book
- The digits of your CPF and phone number (we keep only a derived code)
What the server sees and keeps
- E-mail, name and @username of the account
- Who talks to whom, at what time, and whether the message was delivered
- The approximate size of the locked package
- The members and roles of each group
- The IP address of whoever connects, in the access log
- The profile picture and the device's address for notifications
In one honest sentence: the content is end-to-end encrypted, but NossoChat is not anonymous. Who talks to whom, and when, exists in our systems.
How long the server keeps things
Retention periods
| What | How long |
| Encrypted message package | Only until delivery is confirmed. The server does not keep conversation history. |
| Encrypted file you send | A limited time, only for delivery. |
| Access log (IP address, date and time, connection identifier) | 180 days, in an area restricted to the operator, to comply with Brazil's Marco Civil da Internet (Civil Rights Framework for the Internet). No content. |
| Technical operation logs | 14 days, without IP address and without content. |
| Diagnostic report sent to support (only if you choose to) | 30 days, with fixed fields and a preview before sending. |
| Push notification address | Until you sign out, turn notifications off or delete the account. |
| Account and profile | Until you delete the account. See Account deletion (Portuguese). |
What this does not solve
- Anyone who gets hold of your unlocked phone can read the conversations on it.
- Whoever receives a message can copy it, take a screenshot or forward it. Delete for everyone does not reach that.
- If you forget your password and have no other device signed in to the account, old conversations can no longer be opened. There is no recovery by e-mail or by us.
- Finding people by phone number works with a code derived from the number. That part does not have the same protection as message content, and we are reviewing it before opening the test to everyone.
- We have not published an independent audit of the code yet. We say so you do not assume one exists.
What if an authority asks?
We comply with valid orders within what exists. We may hand over account data and the access log, under the terms of the law. We do not have the content of conversations, so the answer is “we do not possess it”. There is no master key and we will not build one. Channel for authorities: see Contact.
The technical version
This summary is public on purpose. It describes the choices, not the parameters that would make an attack easier.
Message encryption
- One-to-one conversations: an open, heavily reviewed protocol, with PQXDH key agreement (X3DH with a post-quantum Kyber prekey) and the Double Ratchet. Every message uses a new key, and old ones are erased after use (forward secrecy and post-compromise recovery). We use the official
libsignal library; we do not write our own cryptography.
- The server holds only public keys, versioned: identity key, a rotating signed prekey and one-time prekeys that are replenished automatically.
- Multiple devices: identity belongs to the account, sessions belong to each device. The sender encrypts one copy per recipient device and one per other device of their own. The server only checks identifiers.
- Groups: Sender Keys, with one encrypted copy per message, group version and roles on the server, and sender keys only on devices.
- The ratchet state is local to each device and is not backed up.
Password, sign-in and key backup
- Sign-in uses SRP: the device proves it knows the password without sending it. The server never receives the password.
- An encrypted copy of your keys exists on the server (the “keyring”), protected by a key derived from your password with Argon2id on the device, using AES-256-GCM. The server stores only the encrypted file, the salt and the parameters. Without your password, neither we nor our administrators can open that file.
- Consequence: forgetting the password with no other signed-in device means losing access to old conversations. Resetting the password by e-mail gives the account back, but not the keys. An optional recovery key is planned in the project's decisions.
- A new device signs in, downloads the keyring, opens the keys with the password and starts new sessions with your contacts. The server does not copy the past.
Identity and personal data
- The CPF is used once at sign-up, to confirm the age bracket. After that we keep only the bracket (minor or adult) and a code derived with HMAC using a server secret, never the digits.
- The phone number also becomes a derived code before it is compared. Known limit: this secret protects against a database leak, but not against whoever operates the server.
- New-message notifications go through Android's notification system, which is Google's, with fixed text, no content and no sender.
- No log, metric or execution trace may contain message content, keys, passwords, tokens or CPF.
Map and location
Location travels encrypted inside the message, like any other content. The real map is optional: it is only downloaded after you accept, and then the map provider (Amazon Location Service) sees the region shown and the device's IP address. If you do not accept, the card uses a local drawing and no request is made.
Found a flaw?
Write to suporte@nossochat.social.br with what you saw. Please do not publish before giving us a chance to fix it, and do not use other people's data to test.
Last reviewed: November 8, 2026.